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The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime clearly con-
sidered federal firearms policy a central concern. In all, the Task Force
made six recommendations in this area. The one which has attracted
the most legislative attention, however, calls on the Attorney General to
support or propose legislation requiring a mandatory sentence for the
use of a firearm in the commission of a federal felony.' This policy, as
the commentary on the recommendation points out, is widely supported
by the public and the police, and clearly meets the Task Force's three
criteria for sensible policy in this area.2
There are at least five reasons why a mandatory sentencing policy is
especially attractive. First, since it applies only when a firearm is used in
the commission of a felony, it does not impose any restrictions on law-
* The research reported here was supported in part by grants 78-NI-AX-0021 and 79-NI-
AX-0094 from the National Institute of Justice and T32-MH 14598-05 from the National
Institute of Mental Health. Points of view or opinions stated are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
** Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University. Ph.D., Yale University, 1976; M.A.,
Yale University, 1971; B.A., Brooklyn College, 1968.
*** Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan. Ph.D., University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1971; M.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1966; B.A.,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1964.
**** Assistant Professor of Sociology, State University of New York at Buffalo. Ph.D.,
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I U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME:
FINAL REPORT 29 (Recommendation 17) (1981) [hereinafter cited aA TASK FORCE REPORT].
Recommendation 5 in Phase I and Recommendations 17 through 22 in Phase II address
firearm policy.
2 The criteria are (1) that any recommendations be politically feasible; (2) that they bal-
ance the costs associated with gun ownership with the legitimate reasons for owning guns; and
(3) ("most importantly") that a prima facie case can be made that they will reduce violent
crime. Id. at 30 (Commentary).
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abiding citizens who own guns for legitimate purposes. Second, the
direct financial costs of the policy are minimal compared to more gen-
eral mandatory sentencing schemes which would produce large in-
creases in the costs of litigation and incarceration. Because this policy
targets a relatively small group of offenders, it constitutes a strategic al-
location of scarce crime control resources.3 Third, the policy is "just" in
the sense that the public generally agrees that gun crimes are more seri-
ous than others and that those who commit them deserve special punish-
ment.4 Also, since the constraints on judicial discretion apply to
everyone who is accused, the mandatory sentence should contribute to
equity and reduce disparities in sentencing. Fourth, the law promises to
reduce violent crime by deterring potential offenders from committing a
crime, or by channeling them away from guns toward weapons which
are less lethal. Fifth, it is a politically feasible policy. Largely because of
these reasons, the proposed mandatory sentencing policy is difficult to
oppose.
In a previous paper we suggested that a mandatory sentence for
firearms crimes promises something like a criminological wonder drug
- a plan to reduce violent crime at minimal cost with no serious side
effects. 5 Yet in medicine many promising therapies - from snake oil to
laetrile - have proven, on the basis of experience, to be ineffective or to
have damaging side effects. There is similarly some significant experi-
ence with mandatory sentencing for gun offenses which suggests that
there may be unanticipated problems. During the last five years we
have studied effects of a Michigan statute similar to the one recom-
mended by the Task Force. Our research, which is based on the experi-
ence of Detroit's Recorders Court and on violent crime data in the city,
suggests that the expected benefits of the law did not occur and that
there have been serious unexpected costs associated with the policy.
II. BACKGROUND
The Michigan Felony Firearm Law, which went into effect in Janu-
ary of 1977, mandates a "flat" two-year sentence for possessing a firearm
while committing or attempting to commit a felony. The sentence is to
be served preceding and in addition to the sentence imposed for the
3 For a discussion, see C. COOK & D. NAGIN, DoEs THE WEAPON MATTER? (1979).
4 In the spring of 1979 we asked a probability sample of residents of the Detroit metro-
politan area whether they favored a mandatory two-year sentence for felonies committed
with a gun and whether they would favor such a law even if it did not reduce crime and it
cost money to keep more people in prison. Ninety percent of respondents favored the law and
65% favored it even if it had no deterrent effect.
5 Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, Mandatog Sentencing and Fireams Violence: Evaluating an
Alternative to Gun Control, 14 LAw & Soc'y R. (forthcoming).
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underlying felony. In addition, the law prohibits parole, probation, or
suspended sentences.6
We began our research in 1977 just after the law went into effect.
We selected Detroit as a site for the research because of the concentra-
tion of violent crime in the city, and because of the role that the Wayne
County (Detroit) Prosecutor chose to play in the implementation of the
law. He was instrumental in mounting a publicity campaign which in-
cluded billboards and bumper stickers proclaiming, "One with a Gun
Gets You Two." He also announced, as a matter of departmental pol-
icy, that the gun law would be charged in all eligible cases and that
there would be no plea bargaining on this charge.
In order to estimate the impact of the law on the processing of cases
in Detroit's Recorders Court, we collected information on all of the cases
disposed of by the court during 1976, 1977, and 1978 where the original
charge was one of eleven violent felonies (armed robbery, assault with
intent to commit murder, etc.) and conducted a series of interviews with
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. For use in making our esti-
mates of the impact on patterns of crime in the city, we assembled
monthly data on the number of violent crimes reported to the police by
type of weapon for a period of about twelve years (1968-1979).
III. THE EFFECT OF THE LAW ON VIOLENT CRIMES
The year before the gun law went into effect, 1976, was an espe-
cially bad year for law enforcement in Detroit. There was a series of
highly publicized events which emphasized the problems the city was
experiencing with violent crime. While cities of comparable size were
experiencing a five percent decline in violent crime, Detroit suffered
through a five percent increase. Then, in early 1977, a few months after
the gun law went into effect, the police and the media began to cele-
brate a decline in crime which was led by a thirty percent decline in
homicides. By the end of 1977 it was evident that the city had exper-
6 MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 750.227b (1978)(MICHIGAN STAT. ANN. § 28.424(2)(Calla-
ghan 1981)):
(I) A person who carries or has in his possession a firearm at the time he commits or
attempts to commit a felony, except the violation of section 227 or section 227a, is guilty
of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years. Upon a second conviction under this
section, the person shall be imprisoned for 5 years. Upon a third or subsequent convic-
tion under this section, the person shall be imprisoned for 10 years.
(2) The term of imprisonment prescribed by this section shall be in addition to the
sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the felony,
and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed
for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony.
(3) The term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall not be suspended.
The person subject to the sentence mandated by this section shall not be eligible for
parole or probation during the mandatory term imposed pursuant to subsection (1).
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ienced declines of approximately twenty percent in both property and
violent crime.
Understandably, many observers suggested that the gun law was, to
some degree, responsible for this decline. Although the timing of events
made this a natural inference, an extensive statistical analysis of the
data has led us to the conclusion that the ebb in crime enjoyed by De-
troit was unrelated to the gun law and that, in fact, as of 1980 there
were no discernible changes in the level of violent crime, or in the type
of weapons used in crimes, which could be attributed to the law.7 There
are three features of the data that are especially important in reaching
this conclusion. First, the decline in robberies and homicides began at
least five months before the law went into effect and four months before
the publicity campaign for the law began. Second, only for homicides
was the decline significantly greater for gun offenses than for offenses
committed without a gun. For example, the level of armed robberies
fell, but so did that of unarmed robberies. Third, there was no apparent
change in the number of assaults. Initially, we thought the decline in
the number of homicides might reflect a similar decline in gun assaults
which could, in turn, be linked to changes in assault sentences in Re-
corders Court. Having examined all of the data, however, we conclude
that this interpretation no longer fits the facts. Since there was no signif-
icant change in gun assaults which might explain the decline in homi-
cides, we believe that the decline in gun homicides occurred because of
other factors and was not directly related to the gun law.
It is possible that unique features of the Detroit situation prevented
an effect which would have been enjoyed in other settings. Another pos-
sibility is that benefits which were realized in Detroit were masked by
events which occurred along with the intervention of the gun law. As a
matter of scientific inference, the likelihood that the Detroit results are
misleading can be reduced considerably by replicating them in another
setting. Therefore, we are currently investigating crime patterns in sev-
eral cities in the state of Florida, which in October 1975 implemented a
three-year mandatory sentence similar to the Michigan law.8 Our anal-
ysis of the Florida data is not complete, but after examining monthly
data on robberies and assaults in Miami, Jacksonville, and Tampa oc-
curring between January 1968 and December 1979, we have found no
evidence of a change in these crimes which could reasonably be attrib-
uted to the mandatory sentence.
7 Some of the analysis is reported in Loftin & McDowall, "One With A Gun Gets You Two':"
Mandatogr Sentencing and Firearms Violence in Detroit, 455 ANNALS 150 (1981); Loftin, Heumann
& McDowall, supra note 5. These patterns are quite different from what one would expect if
the gun law had any deterrent or incapacitative effect on violent crime.
8 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.087(2) (West 1976).
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There are two possible general explanations of why the mandatory
sentence did not produce the expected preventive effects. The first is
that the courts found ways of circumventing the mandatory provisions
of the law and therefore there was no objective change in sanctions. The
second is that potential offenders are not responsive to a mandatory two
or three year sentence enhancement.
Although we cannot rule out the first explanation, we think it is the
less likely of the two. Although, as we describe below, there was no step-
like increase in the certainty and severity of sentences in Detroit, never-
theless this was a tough law. There were no major loopholes in its for-
mulation and the Wayne County Prosecutor was aggressive in his policy
of charging the law and resisting attempts to circumvent it. Our inter-
views indicate that, in spite of some cynicism about the impact of the
law, many defendants were concerned that they might get caught in its
rigid flat time provisions. A strong message was sent to the community
that gun offenders would be dealt with sternly. Over a period of time it
is possible that experience with the behavior of the courts demonstrated
to the criminal community that the sentences had not changed very
much. If this were the case, however, we could expect to find an initial
reduction in crimes with a gun followed by a gradual return to the pre-
vious levels. There is no indication of this type of pattern in the data.
Thus, this interpretation would fit the data only if we are willing to
assume that potential offenders, who would have been responsive to an
actual change in sanctions, were from the outset insensitive to the pub-
licity campaign and the aggressive charging policy of the prosecutor.
While we cannot rule it out completely, we think this is unlikely.
The second explanation, that potential offenders are not sensitive to
a two- or three-year mandatory sentence enhancement, is more persua-
sive. The scope of this type of law is very narrow. In fact, the number of
people who could possibly be influenced by its provisions may be negli-
gible. Legally it applies only to felonies committed while in possession of
a gun and not to the "included" offense of carrying a gun illegally. This
means that it cannot influence the carrying of a gun unless a person is
planning to commit a felony. For those who are planning a serious
crime, the possibility that they may meet armed resistance provides a
powerful inducement to carry a gun which, in all but the most unusual
circumstances, would completely overwhelm the deterrent effect of i
two-year mandatory enhancement for a felony which already carries the
risk of a substantial sentence. The law can therefore be expected to
reach the behavior of only those offenders who are planning to commit a
felony in circumstances where there is little likelihood of meeting armed
resistance, and who, prior to the gun law, would have used a gun.
Clearly this is a very small group.
1982] 1055
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One may feel that the mandatory sentence for gun felonies is a de-
sirable policy even if it does not prevent violent crime. It is a just policy
which clearly expresses the community's sentiments that gun crimes are
serious crimes and should be punished accordingly. In this sense there is
no harm and perhaps some community benefit from the policy. On the
other hand, the fact that many people believe that it will reduce crime is
not only a significant source of support for the policy, it is also a drain
on public support for other gun policies which would reduce the availa-
bility of guns and thus may have more of an influence on gun crimes. In
this sense the mandatory sentencing policy may impose a significant op-
portunity cost on the community. It preempts support for other, per-
haps more effective, gun control policies.
IV. THE RESPONSE OF TRIAL COURTS
Thus far we have limited our evaluation to a consideration of the
effect of the proposed mandatory gun law on crime rates. Although we
suppose the law could be defended as one which simply advertises a
mandatory sentence, and which does not speak to the issues of how and
even whether the law is actually applied in the courts, we think it a fair
conclusion that the Attorney General's Task Force intended that the
proposed law in fact be imposed, that it not merely be a symbolic state-
ment without any alterations in trial court practice.
Indeed, the Task Force evidences a considerable degree of concern
and sophistication in its commentary on the law. It recognizes the tradi-
tional weakness associated with a mandatory sentence, namely, that it
can be used as a tool in the plea bargaining process, a chip for the prose-
cutor to trade off in return for a plea. Specifically, the Task Force warns
that "the power to impose this sentence should not be vitiated by any
opportunities on the part of prosecutors to circumvent it through the use
of plea bargaining, charge reduction, or other methods."9
This is, we believe, an important component of the Task Force posi-
tion. All too often sentence reforms designed to limit judicial discretion
ignore the complementary discretion exercised by prosecutors. Thus, ef-
forts to limit the judge frequently have the consequence of enhancing
the discretion of the prosecutor. The Task Force was aware of the prob-
lem, and it wisely counseled against this outcome.
Nevertheless, problems remain. First, there is a problem of omis-
sion. The comments of the Task Force suggest that once charged the
mandatory sentence ought not be manipulated. It does not address the
traditional prerogative of the prosecutor to decide whether a particular
charge should be levelled in the first instance. Prosecutors - and U.S.
9 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30 (Commentary).
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Attorneys - are under no obligation to charge each and every count
that may apply to a particular defendant. Indeed, central to most con-
ceptions of the fair and wise exercise of prosecutorial discretion is the
notion of selectivity in charging. In the area of mandatory sentencing,
many believe it especially important that such discretion be exercised.
In issuing his "Principles of Federal Prosecution," then Attorney Gen-
eral Benjamin Civiletti wrote:
In assessing the likelihood that a charge of the most serious 'offense will
result in a sustainable conviction, the attorney for the government should
bear in mind some of the less predictable attributes of those rare federal
offenses that carry a mandatory, minimum term of imprisonment. In many
instances, the term the legislature has specified certainly would not be
viewed as inappropriate. In other instance [sic], however, unusually miti-
gating circumstances may make the specified penalty appear so out of pro-
portion to the seriousness of defendant's conduct that the jury or judge in
assessing guilt, or the judge in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, may
be influenced by the inevitable consequence of conviction. In such cases,
the attorney for the government should consider whether charging a differ-
ent offense that reaches the same conduct, but that does not carry a
mandatory penalty, might not be more appropriate under the
circumstances. 10
It is not clear if Civiletti's views comport with those of the Task
Force. Does the Task Force expect selectivity in charging, with the con-
comitant decrease in "mandatory" application of the penalty, or does it
instead desire that prosecutors eschew discretion in these cases and
charge the law whenever the facts warrant it? If the Task Force is "com-
fortable" with the former, then pre-indictment plea bargaining, or the
re-drawing of indictments after plea negotiations, are likely to remain as
possible techniques of circumvention. Even without these machinations,
the exercise of traditional prosecutorial discretion will, as suggested
above, make the mandatory sentences something less than mandatory.
We cannot be sure what the Task Force intended, although the
tone of the commentary certainly suggests that it anticipated fairly rigid
chargiig practices coupled with stringent prohibitions on plea bargain-
ing. For our discussion, then, it is useful to assume that the U.S. Attor-
neys would employ the proposed gun law when warranted, and adhere
to strictures against subsequent manipulations of the provision. Ac-
cepting this assumption, however, raises two additional questions re-
garding the consequences of the proposed mandatory sentencing plan.
First, can a U.S. Attorney or a prosecutor's office sufficiently control and
monitor subordinate behavior to insure compliance with a law banning
the exercise of discretion in a subset of cases? Second, if the office can




successfully limit discretion, is the law likely to achieve its desired pur-
poses, namely, insuring the mandatory application of a penalty to all
gun offenders?
Again, the findings from our research into the mandatory firearms
penalty in Detroit are instructive in addressing these issues. With re-
spect to the first issue - and admittedly to our surprise - a prohibition
on prosecutorial plea bargaining imposed by the Wayne County Prose-
cutor seemed, in large measure, to work. By closely monitoring compli-
ance and by visibly sanctioning a few assistant prosecutors who deviated
from the policy, the Prosecutor made his position, and his commitment
to the gun law, well know throughout his office. Subordinates, although
not infrequently in disagreement with the mandatory provisions in par-
ticular cases, were forced in plea discussions to take a "my hands are
tied" position. Thus, the Detroit implementation, rather than repre-
senting the typical response to mandatory sentencing (i.e., an increase in
prosecutorial plea bargaining), in large measure adhered to the very
posture the Task Force Report seems to advance. The question that
remains is, given this forceful implementation, what were the conse-
quences for defendants sentenced in Detroit's Recorders Court?
By and large, the consequences were very few. In comparing de-
fendants charged with similar offenses before and after the implementa-
tion of the mandatory sentence, we found that the percentage of
defendants falling within a particular dispositional category (e.g., no
prison sentence) remained fairly constant. Although there were some
changes at the margins, and although these were usually in the direction
of some increase in sentence length, overall the two-year mandatory sen-
tence in Detroit did not lead to a two-year increase in sentence length
for defendants convicted of serious offenses, nor did it lead to a two-year
sentence for defendants who, prior to the law, would not have received a
prison sentence. 1
Notwithstanding the prohibition on plea bargaining and the re-
strictions imposed on judicial discretion by the mandatory sentence, the
system managed in large measure (but not completely) to "absorb" the
mandatory sentence without substantially upsetting the norms that had
guided its practices in the earlier period. This was largely accomplished
through two mechanisms. First, in the serious cases where defendants
had previously received substantial periods of incarceration, judges were
increasingly drawn into sentence negotiations with defense attorneys.
The result of these negotiations was often a decrease in the sentence on
the primary felony to offset the additional sentence required by the gun
II For a detailed discussion of these findings see Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, supra note
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law count. Thus, for the "bad" defendants, not much changed. They
did essentially the same time both before and after the law went into
effect.
The less serious offenses and offenders raised more difficult
problems. Prior to the gun law, defendants in such cases received a
short period of incarceration, or more typically, probation. The gun
law, however, like the Task Force proposal, requires a substantial period
of incarceration. This major change in the court's norm made many
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys quite uncomfortable. Within
the ambit of the mandatory provision were many so-called "equity
cases," cases in which the mandatory two-year sentence provison ap-
plied but in which, in some sense, no one felt sure that such a term was
deserved. These were the same sort of cases to which the Civiletti guide-
lines referred in discussing prosecutorial discretion,1 2 the cases that are
inevitably swept up when one passes a general statute which necessarily
applies to the almost infinite variety of offenses a court processes. In
Detroit these equity cases placed an enormous strain on the system.
Judges confronted the predicament of having to sentence a defendant to
two years in state prison when they felt the sentence was inconsistent
with their prior sentencing norms, and perhaps more importantly, with
a sense of proportionality in punishment. Defendants not swept up by
the gun law but guilty of more serious offenses were faring better than
these "equity" defendants.
The response of the court was to process many of these cases in
bench or waiver trials. As is the case with the Task Force recommenda-
tion, the mandatory sentencing provison of the Michigan law attaches
only to felonies. Thus, if judges found defendants guilty of a misde-
meanor in a bench trial, by definition the mandatory provision fell by
the wayside, an outcome which, of course, resurrected judicial discre-
tion. These trials took two forms. Sometimes they were in fact "wired"
-arranged in advance (sometimes with the acquiescence of the assistant
prosecutor) by the defense attorney and the judge; other times defense
attorneys were forced to gamble on the judge's sense of the inappropri-
ateness of the penalty, and hope that he or she "would take care of it"
during a bench trial. In the "wired" trial the outcome was assured; in
the others the gamble was generally, but not always, successful.
To summarize, the simultaneous restriction of prosecutorial discre-
tion and the introduction of a mandatory sentence increased judicial
participation in sentence bargaining and the use of sub rosa techniques to
avoid the gun law in less serious cases. Detroit, like the federal system,
did not have a long tradition of extensive judicial participation in sen-
12 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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tence negotiations; as a result of the gun law, judicial participation in-
creased. Moreover, like most jurisdictions, Detroit had been moving
toward a process of opening up plea negotiations by putting these nego-
tiations and agreements on the record; wired trials thwarted this process,
at least in part, as sub rosa deals replaced open agreements. Finally, it is
worth repeating that although most defendants benefited by these ar-
rangements, some did not. In large measure the gun law was "ab-
sorbed" by the court; to the extent it was not, it worked selectively, and
often seemingly whimsically, in terms of the particular defendants who
experienced the sentencing increment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
These findings should be viewed as illustrative and not necessarily
predictive of what might happen in the federal system should the Task
Force recommendations succeed. The federal system is in some impor-
tant respects different from state court systems, particularly in terms of a
tradition of rules limiting the role of the federal judiciary in plea and
sentence negotiation. Nonetheless, we think it is plausible to argue that
if the mandatory sentencing provision is charged across the board, and
that if prohibitions on plea negotiations are rigorously adhered to, simi-
lar tensions are likely to arise in the federal system.' 3 Perhaps the par-
ticipants in the federal system will simply accept these tensions, and
concede inequalities as a cost of achieving some level of certainty of pun-
ishment. Although we think this is a less likely result than the contrary
posture adopted in Detroit, both approaches raise obvious policy
concerns.
Whether the benefits reaped from the mandatory sentence are
worth the price under either set of responses is a matter that turns on
one's values and on one's judgment of the efficacy -whether symbolic
or real - of this sort of policy toward gun control. Because we are
uncomfortable with either set of judicial responses and unable to discern
any deterrent effect of the law (at least as applied in Detroit), and be-
cause these sorts of statutes may prevent more systematic assaults on gun
violence, we remain quite unconvinced of the desirability of mandatory
sentences. Alternate policies, more systematic in addressing the question
of violent firearm offenses, and affording an opportunity for the struc-
tured exercise of discretion by prosecutors and judges, strike us as more
promising avenues for policy consideration.
13 Cases in the federal courts, of course, differ from those in state courts. Nonetheless, it is
still likely that the distribution of federal gun cases - assuming no selectivity in charging
will include its share of "equity" cases.
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